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I. Introduction
Those who do not have power over the story that dominates 
their lives, the power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke 
about it, and change it as times change, truly are powerless, 
because they cannot think new thoughts. 
–Salman Rushdie
Cognitive research reveals that humans structure and understand 
experiences in narrative form.1  What this means is that we force facts 
into a story so that we can understand what happened, what will 
happen, as well as to decide what to think of what happened and will 
happen.  The primary tool used to accomplish this is a stock story. 
Humans view the world through stock stories,2 which allow us to 
interpret and comprehend everyday events based on the minimal 
facts with which we are provided, without constantly having to 
analyze or question what we are doing.3  Stock stories allow us to 
make decisions based on minimal facts because they supplement 
those facts with assumptions about how the world works and how the 
current events should play out.  As a consequence, stock stories 
provide an interpretive framework for comprehending the 
significance of new circumstances, guiding an individual’s 
interpretation of what happened, and shaping that individual’s 
judgment regarding what should happen in the future. 
Since stories function as a cognitive shortcut that supplements 
facts in a given situation and incorporate the dominant values in a 
given society,4 a lawyer who relies only on analytical reasoning will 
not be as effective in persuading a legal audience as the lawyer who 
1. Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far,
Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in 
Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 257 (2009); 
Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 717 
(1994); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984); Brian J. Foley, 
Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 LEGAL WRITING:  J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 17, 55 (2008). 
2. Lopez, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10.
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incorporates stories into his or her strategy.5  Lawyers are trained to 
value logical argumentation; laypersons are not.6  Consequently, 
narrative is a powerful tool for persuasion.7  Therefore, in order to 
persuade a legal audience, whether it is a judge or jury, a lawyer must 
be able to identify the potential stock stories that may be triggered by 
the facts of a client’s case and avoid harmful stock stories and the 
unfavorable embedded knowledge structures associated with them.8  
The lawyer must be able to couch the client’s story in terms of a 
favorable stock story or, at least, manipulate the elements of the new 
story in a way that circumvents the unfavorable aspects of the stock 
story.  But what makes one narrative more persuasive or believable to 
an audience than another? 
When choosing among multiple stories, credibility judgments are 
based on normative rationality.9  To enjoy narrative rationality, a 
story must seem plausible.10  Narrative rationality is comprised of 
several threads that work together to weave a plausible story.  The 
first thread, narrative coherence, requires not only that a story be 
complete but also internally consistent.11  It focuses on making sure 
that the internal elements of the story (such as factual reconstruction, 
character, setting, plot, etc.) make sense when viewed as a whole12 and 
that the story and the evidence presented match up.13  The second 
thread of narrative rationality is narrative correspondence.  Narrative 
correspondence requires that the structural elements of the story told 
by the lawyer match up with the structural elements of a stock story. 
Therefore, if a story is congruent with the stock story, it triggers the 
5. Steven J. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth: The Ethics of Telling Stories to
Clients, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 961, 980 (2006) (hereinafter Johansen, This Is Not the Whole 
Truth). 
6. Id.
7. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267; Foley, supra note 1, at 40.
8. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 296.
9. Elizabeth Fagans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading
Practice, 15 LEGAL WRITING:  J. LEG. WRITING INST. 3, 20 (2009); Steven J. Johansen, 
Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?: An Essay on the Ethical Limits of Applied Legal 
Storytelling, 7 J. OF THE ASS’N. OF LEG. WRITING DIRECTORS 63, 64 (2010) (hereinafter 
Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?). 
10. BERNARD JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 11 (1988).
11. J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
14 LEGAL WRITING:  J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 64 (2008); Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, 
at 20. 
12. Jonathan Yovel, Running Backs, Wolves, and Other Fatalities: How
Manipulations of Narrative Coherence in Legal Opinions Marginalize Violent Death, 16 
LAW & LIT. 127, 131 (2004). 
13. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
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contextual presuppositions held by the audience and will seem 
plausible and persuasive.14  The third thread of narrative rationality is 
narrative fidelity.  Narrative fidelity concerns whether the substance 
of the story comports with the embedded knowledge provided by the 
stock story that it triggers.15  Fidelity focuses on whether the story 
accurately portrays social reality and satisfies the audience’s 
expectations regarding how the story should play out.16 
When a stock story is so pervasive that it will not allow a lawyer to 
ignore it, or a more favorable alternative story does not exist, a 
lawyer can present the client’s story from an alternative perspective 
that will not evoke the embedded knowledge structures triggered by 
the unfavorable stock story.17  The lawyer can accomplish this by 
tinkering with the different threads of narrative rationality to improve 
the persuasiveness of the story he or she tells.  In this article, I will 
suggest that the principles of narrative coherence, correspondence, 
and fidelity can help the lawyer whose client does not fit comfortably 
within one of our culture’s stock stories (e.g., the big bad wolf who 
wasn’t really bad). Specifically, the lawyer who limits the client’s story 
to the facts leading to the litigation focuses on the persuasive power 
of narrative coherence by ensuring that the story is plausible, as all 
aspects of it mesh with one another.  On the other hand, the lawyer 
who shifts from a narrow to a broader view of a case will rely on the 
persuasive power of narrative correspondence by mapping a cultural 
myth onto his or her client’s story.  Finally, by creating friction 
between the client’s character and the outcome associated with a 
stock story, the lawyer can draw on the persuasive power of narrative 
fidelity and shift the reader’s expectations about how things should 
turn out. 
II. Why Narrative Frameworks are Necessary for More
Effective Persuasion 
Cognitive researchers have discovered that human perception and 
cognition require interpretive frameworks on which to construct 
14. Rideout, supra note 1, at 67; Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.
15. WALTER R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE AND ACTION 105 (1989); Rideout, supra note 12, at 70. 
16. Johansen, This is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982; Rideout, supra note
11, at 70 (quoting FISHER, supra note 15, at 64). 
17. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267; Linda Berger, How Embedded Knowledge
Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making:  A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative 
And Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 299–300 
(2009). 
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meaning and reality.18  Hence, humans comprehend new experiences 
by fitting them into interpretive frameworks called schemas.19  
Schemas are cognitive frameworks that contain and organize an 
individual’s expectations and understanding of the world.20  Schemas 
allow an individual to assess new situations and ideas without having 
to interpret them anew21 and prevent an individual from having to 
expend cognitive energy to  
map out inferences and relationships for every new situation.22  
Thus, schemas are cognitive shortcuts that convert new 
scenarios into events that are within an individual’s scope of 
experience23 because they ‘help an individual understand 
people, events, objects, and their relationships to each other in 
a way that is meaningful ‘based on what [that individual has] 
come to believe is natural through experience within a 
particular culture.’24 
An individual requires more information than that supplied by an 
unfamiliar situation to construct the meaning of that new situation.25  
Schemas offer this additional information because they tap into an 
individual’s inherent knowledge and provide an explanation that goes 
beyond the information that is currently before the individual.26  
Therefore, schemas are constantly, and unconsciously, shaping an 
18. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 717.
19. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259; Clive Baldwin, Who Needs Facts When You’ve
Got Narrative?  The Case of P, C & S v. United Kingdom, 18 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 217, 
236 (2005); Berger, supra note 17, at 264. 
20. Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1133 (2004) (quoting 
MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED 
INTRODUCTION 34 (1995)). 
21. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700; Berger, supra note 17, at 265.
22. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 265).
23. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 265.
24. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 265).
25. Id. at 260; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700–01.
26. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 260; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 701.  For example, it is
not problematic when we are told that John went to a party and woke up the next morning 
with a headache, though no explanation is given as to why John had a headache the 
morning after a party, this is not a problem.  Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700.  A schema will 
provide an explanation for these events: it is commonly known that people drink too much 
alcohol at parties and feel hungover the next morning.  Id. at 700. 
 192 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:2
individual’s perception of new situations and affecting what he or she 
sees, thinks, and feels.27 
A narrative, or story, functions as a cognitive framework where 
multiple schemas are operating at once.28  Humans comprehend 
concepts expressed in terms of narratives better than those expressed 
as abstract principles.29  Thus, narratives are crucial to an individual’s 
ability to comprehend a series of chronological events.30  As a 
consequence, humans are predisposed to arrange experiences in story 
form.31  In fact, narratives are an inherent way for humans to make 
sense of their experiences.32 
A stock story, which is sometimes referred to as a myth,33 is a 
mechanism by which the members of a culture can interpret certain 
experiences34 and give them social meaning.35  Stock stories 
accomplish this by functioning as a template for a wide variety of 
similar stories to follow.36  This template supplies the individual with 
the ordinary course of events and allows the individual to predict the 
outcome.37  Also, stock stories cast people in particular roles that 
serve as templates for the characters that we may encounter in a given 
situation.38  Thus, stock stories serve as recipes that allow individuals 
to predict the types of characters they might come in contact with in a 
particular situation, what will happen during the course of that 
particular situation, and what they will need to do in response to 
27. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 260; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700, 717; Berger, supra
note 17, at 262, 266. 
28. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 260.
29. Id. at 261.
30. Berger, supra note 17, at 266; ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW 30–31 (2000). 
31. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (1990); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY
OF THE TRIAL 159 (1999); Rideout, supra note 11, at 57. 
32. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 257, 261.
33. Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law:  Myth, Metaphor and Authority, 77
TENN. L. REV. 883, 889 (2010).  Stock stories are also called “master stories,” “meta-
stories,” “scripts,” and “archetypes.”  Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 268; Foley, supra note 
1, at 40; Rideout, supra note 11, at 59. 
34. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 261; Berger, supra note 18, at 268; Judith Olans Brown
et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender:  Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 
6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 457–58 (1996). 
35. Rideout, supra note 11, at 59.
36. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 261; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST:  LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 106–13 (2003); Steven L. Winter, Making the Familiar 
Conventional Again, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1607, 1629 (2001); Berger, supra note 17, at 268. 
37. Berger, supra note 17, at 268; AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 30, at 17.
38. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 262; Edwards, supra note 33, at 890.
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those particular circumstances.39  Furthermore, stock stories provide a 
social evaluation of the events that occur.  As a result, once a stock 
story has been triggered, the individual’s judgments will be based on 
assumptions derived from the social knowledge embedded in that 
story rather than on the unique characteristics of the current 
situation.40  Furthermore, the outcome suggested by the stock story 
will seem to be the natural result of the events that preceded it.41  
Once the biasing effects of the stock story have been triggered, the 
only way to change the individual’s mind is to present the individual 
with evidence that is inconsistent with the expectations or inferences 
created by the interpretive framework.42 
Because stock stories perform an essential role in forming an 
individual’s judgments about the outcome of a case, they serve an 
important part in the legal process.43  As a result, stock stories can be 
a hazard for an unsuspecting lawyer since they operate 
subconsciously to free us from the need to think critically, reinforce 
traditional cultural views, guide our judgments and evaluations in new 
situations, and make certain preordained outcomes seem inevitable.44  
Consequently, lawyers must be able to recognize when the facts of 
their client’s case trigger one or more stock stories.45  They must also 
39. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 262; Berger, supra note 17, at 266.
40. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 263.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Chen & Hanson, supra note 20, at 1229–30.
43. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 264; Rideout, supra note 11, at 54.
44. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265 (footnote omitted).
45. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 305; Edwards, supra note 33, at 884, 891.
 A particular set of circumstances often will trigger more than one potential stock story.  A 
particular situation 
is not always understood as “like” only one or a limited number of stock 
structures. . . . [A situation] often takes on new and important meaning 
when matched with a seemingly unrelated stock structure.  [For 
example,] [m]uch was learned about dolphins by comparing them to 
humans and not just to sharks. 
To accommodate this open-endedness, [an individual] employs a system 
of qualifiers.  Qualifiers demonstrate the likeness of a happening and a 
stock structure both by admitting the imperfection of the match and at 
the same time by insisting strenuously (though often implicitly) on the 
significant similarity. 
Lopez, supra note 1, at 17–18. Individuals process new events by “comparing and 
contrasting [them] with his available stock structures—by making likeness judgments. 
‘This . . . [new event] is like ‘that’ stock structure if a limited number of representative 
features of the [event] parallel closely enough [for the individual’s] purposes features of 
the stock story.”  Id. at 16.  Thus, 
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be aware of the potentially harmful effects that some stories may have 
on their client’s case, and be able to find an alternative story that 
reinforces views favorable to the client or manipulate the structure of 
their client’s story to avoid those harmful effects.46 
III. How to Work with Stock Stories to Make your Client’s
Story More Persuasive than the Competing Story of the
Opposing Party 
How stories are framed is extremely important to the success of a 
lawyer’s case.47  And given that “different legal consequences can 
follow from the choice of one story rather than another,”48 it is critical 
that lawyers select the story that is most beneficial to their client’s 
case.  Thus, to be an effective advocate, a lawyer must recognize the 
stock stories that the facts of their client’s case may trigger49 and also 
recognize the potentially harmful effects that some of those stories 
may have on their client’s case.50  Furthermore, “if one possible stock 
story will further an outmoded cultural view harmful to the client’s 
case,” the lawyer must “successfully match the client’s story to an 
alternative story that reinforces views beneficial to the client.”51 
In the event that a suitable alternative stock story is not available, 
a lawyer must present the client’s story from an alternative 
perspective that will not evoke the embedded knowledge structures 
triggered by the unfavorable stock story.52  The lawyer must tell a 
[i]f [an individual’s] thought processes were monitored as he assimilated
into stock structures what goes on in [a situation], [he or she] would
encounter variations of the following theme:  “This happening is
essentially like that stock structure.”  “This happening is nearly like that
stock structure.” “This happening is loosely speaking like that stock
structure.”  “This happening is in an odd sense like that stock structure.” .
. . In this sense, qualifiers compose a system of likeness statements that
allow [an individual] flexibility in determining whether features of “what
is” match features of a stock structure closely enough to allow “what is”
to be comprehended and organized.
Id. at 17–18. 
46. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265; Edwards, supra note 33, at 884, 891.
47. Kim Lane Scheppel, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2085
(1989). 
48. Id.
49. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265; Berger, supra note 17, at 305; Edwards, supra note
33, at 884. 
50. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265; Edwards, supra note 33, at 2.
51. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265.
52. Id. at 267; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300.
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“counterstory.”53  A counterstory “‘may overcome the mind’s natural 
tendency to take [cognitive] shortcuts’ that transform unfamiliar 
situations into events that are within an individual’s range of 
experience”54 because they present the client’s circumstances from a 
new perspective.55  Thus, counterstories can reveal a new or different 
reality, “showing us that there are possibilities for life other than the 
ones we live . . ..”56  To avoid unfavorable embedded knowledge 
structures, counterstories use techniques that short-circuit the 
inherent structure and understanding that is provided by stock 
stories.57  Counterstories present the information anew—they move 
from the original view of the story to one that is more narrow or more 
expansive, present contradictory information that creates friction 
between the original story and the outcome that is not favorable to 
your client, present facts out of context, tell the story from a 
contrarian viewpoint, or create a new label or category.58 
When telling a counterstory because no suitable alternative stock 
story is available, a lawyer must remember that the story he or she 
tells on behalf of the client must be plausible to the audience.59  The 
story must “make sense.”60  To make sense, a story must unfold in a 
logical manner and the characters must act as we expect them to act.61  
Simply put, a story must match up with the audience’s understanding 
of how the world usually operates.62  The lawyer must convince the 
audience that the events in the client’s story “could have happened 
that way.”63  The story must be credible, more credible than the story 
told by the other party.  So what makes one story more credible than 
another?  Some narrative theorists believe that judgments about 
credibility are based on narrative rationality.64 
53. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989). 
54. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 300).
55. Berger, supra note 17, at 300 (construing AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note
30, at 1). 
56. Delgado, supra note 53, at 2414; Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267.
57. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267.
58. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300.
59. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 268; Rideout, supra note 11, at 66.
60. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?, supra note 9, at 67.
61. Id.
62. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting Rideout, supra note 11, at 66).
63. Rideout, supra note 11, at 66 (quoting BURNS, supra note 31, at 168).
64. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?,
supra note 9, at 64. 
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A. Narrative Rationality
It is important to note that the court is not concerned with the
truth of the story—as it is not possible to measure truth in objective 
terms—but rather is concerned with the plausibility of the story.65  
Does the story ring true?66  Thus, the story that is told and the way 
that story is told will have substantial impact on the perceived 
credibility of the story.67  The story selected, the elements of the story 
(such as setting, plot, and character), and the amount of detail 
provided will all have a bearing on the audience’s judgment about the 
story.68  Additionally, the central events of a story must relate to each 
other in a coherent fashion to be credible.69  Furthermore, some 
contextual detail, which may be irrelevant to the basic story line, must 
accompany those events in order to place them in a context that the 
audience can recognize.70  What this means is that, to be persuasive, to 
resonate with the audience, a story must have narrative rationality.71  
The concept of narrative rationality is comprised of three aspects—
65. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 11.  Remember, stories do not have to be true to be
believable.  Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist, supra note 10, at 67.  “Fiction can 
be believable, and the truth can seem implausible, or downright impossible.”  Id.  For 
example, in Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?, Steven Johansen relates a story that a cab 
driver shared with him during a tour of Northern Ireland.  Id. at 66.  According to the cab 
driver, Colonel Sanders was in Ireland during World War I, became ill, received medical 
care from a Protestant nurse, and as a result, became an ardent supporter of the Protestant 
cause and donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to the UDA, one of the most violent 
terrorist organizations in the Western world.  Id.  Johansen relates that he was surprised to 
learn this before the cab driver admitted that the story was not true, that he had told it to 
show that “[p]eople will believe anything if you tell a good story.”  Id. at 67.  Johansen 
posits that after hearing the cab driver’s story, people, including himself, believe that 
Colonel Sanders “might have supported a terrorist organization even though the claim is 
completely false and contrary to everything they might have ever heard about Colonel 
Sanders” because “the story [made] sense.  The characters acted as we would expect them 
to act [and t]he storyteller seemed credible.”  Id. 
66. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 11.  Credibility is a function of the evidence as a
whole, not a “matter of individual witnesses or individuals items of testimony.”  Id. 
67. Rideout, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT 
IN AMERICAN CULTURE 89 (1981)). 
68. Id. (quoting BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 89 n.4).
69. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 11–12.
70. Id.  Jackson notes that, while some level of detail is needed to provide context
and believability, one should avoid providing so much detail that the basic storyline is 
submerged.  Id. 
71. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?, supra note 9, at 67–68.  Again, it is
important to keep in mind that “the persuasiveness of a story does not turn on its truth.  It 
turns on its narrative rationality—its logical coherence, its correspondence to audience 
expectations.”  Id. at 68. 
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narrative coherence, correspondence, and fidelity.72  Stories that fail 
to persuade are lacking in one or more of these areas. 
1. Narrative Coherence
Coherence73 is the primary characteristic that provides legal
narratives plausibility and credibility.74  The more coherent the story, 
the more probable it will seem.75  When faced with competing stories, 
an audience is persuaded less by “Bayesian probability calculi of 
discrete events”76 than by the story that seems more probable.77  This 
means that the audience is persuaded more effectively by a story 
when the “factual reconstruction, character reconstruction, and other 
objects of narration make sense in a more holistic, gestalt manner 
than that suggested by a body of doctrine preoccupied with technical 
‘admissibility,’ ‘relevance,’ and ‘weight’ of information-bytes, which 
are principle concerns of the law of evidence.”78  In order to have 
narrative coherence, a story must accomplish two things.79  It must be 
internally consistent and it must be complete.80 
First, legal storytelling demands internal consistency because the 
“full story, the ‘real’ story is seldom told.”81  Adjudicators construct 
stories out of the story framework suggested by the lawyer and the 
evidence that has been presented.82  Thus, for a story to have internal 
consistency, the various elements of the story must match up and the 
story framework and the evidence presented must fit together.83  
Constructing a story requires the audience to make inferences, and 
the audience can only make those inferences when the underlying 
story structure is internally consistent.84  Therefore, the elements of 
72. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20.
73. Narrative coherence is generally treated as a synonym for “narrative probability”
when discussing the characteristics of narratives.  Rideout, supra note 12, at 64. 
74. Yovel, supra note 12, at 129; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.  Yovel notes that the
need for coherence is “hardly a novel claim:  the forebearer of all western treatises on 
literary theory—Aristotle’s Poetics, written in the fourth century b.c.e.—asserts the ‘unity 
of plot’ as a principal poetic postulate . . ..[U]nity is . . . the narrative crux around which 
the action builds.”  Yovel, supra note 12, at 129. 
75. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
76. Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.
77. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
78. Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.
79. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64; Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20.
80. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64; Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20.
81. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
82. Id.
83. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
84. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64–65.
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the story must seem related to each other.85  Further, the concept of 
internal consistency extends beyond the elements of the story 
themselves and includes consistency between the story framework 
provided by the lawyer and the evidence that has been presented.86  If 
the elements of the story are consistent, and the story and the 
evidence are consistent, the story will be more likely seem true.87  
However, if the parts of the story or the story and the evidence 
contradict each other, the story will likely seem implausible.88  The 
lack of internal consistency will impede the audience’s ability to allow 
for relationships and connections between the story’s parts; 
consequently, the story will seem implausible.89 
Second, the story must be complete.90  Even if a story is internally 
consistent, it will be unconvincing if it is incomplete.91  Completeness 
measures whether sufficient facts are present to ground the inferences 
that the audience will need to make92 and whether the parts of the 
story seem adequate when considered as a whole.93  When making the 
inferential steps necessary to construct a story, the audience must rely 
on embedded knowledge structures, like stock stories, for guidance.94  
If the story structure fails to contain all the expected elements, then 
the audience’s ability to reference embedded knowledge structures 
breaks down.95 
In sum, a legal audience is more likely to find for a party who 
presents the facts as part of a coherent story rather than as a jumble 
of facts with nothing to bind them together.96  The more coherent a 
story is, the more internal consistency and completeness it enjoys, the 
more persuasive the story will be.  Additionally, a highly coherent 
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 65; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 528 (1991). 
87. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64–65.
88. Id. at 65.
89. Id.
90. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
91. Rideout, supra note 11, at 65.
92. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 65; BENNETT &
FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 44–45. 
93. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
94. Id. at 65; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 44–45.
95. Rideout, supra note 12, at 65; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 44–45;
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 86, at 528. 
96. Rideout, supra note 11, at 66 (quoting Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court:
Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 562 (1991). 
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story will make it more likely that the audience will accept a party’s 
story regardless of the “informational content of the evidence.”97 
2. Narrative Correspondence
Narrative correspondence, sometimes referred to as external
narrative coherence,98 also plays an important role in a story’s 
plausibility and persuasiveness.99  A story enjoys narrative 
correspondence when it satisfies the audience’s sense that the events 
could have happened that way100 and is congruent with what the 
audience knows typically happens in the world.101  The audience’s 
sense of what happens in the world is based on stock stories and the 
course of events that are inherently associated with them.102 
The story must correspond to what “could” happen, or what 
“typically” happens, not to what actually happened. A decision-
maker determines what “could” happen by relying on a cache of 
background knowledge provided by a set of stock stories rather than 
by undertaking an empirical assessment of actual events.103 
Stock stories allow us to organize experiences, even in the 
presence of limited information, because they are unconscious 
cognitive frameworks that are automatically invoked to comprehend 
new information.104  Additionally, stock stories are highly generalized 
to cover a broad range of factual situations.105  They are not objective 
representations of reality, but rather are idealized representations 
that effectively characterize some, though not all, of the varied 
situations that humans confront in their day to day lives.106  Once a 
lawyer has triggered a stock story, he or she may “tap[] into the 
97. Id. (quoting Lempert, supra note 96, at 562).
98. Yovel, supra note 12, at 130; Rideout, supra note 11, at 67; JACKSON, supra note
11, at 58–59.  Commentators refer to narrative correspondence as external narrative 
coherence because it “relies on relationships with something outside the trial story itself.” 
Rideout, supra note 11, at 67. 
99. Rideout, supra note 11, at 66.
100. Id. (quoting BURNS, supra note 31, at 168).
101. Id.
102. Id.; Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at
57. Thus, while narrative correspondence “may sound like a kind of reality check on the
story being constructed at trial, . . . correspondence is structural, not referential or ‘truth-
based.’”  Rideout, supra note 11, at 67.
103. Id.
104. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20–21.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 21.
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‘stock’ information and combine[] it with ‘new information,’” to tell a 
more concrete story based on the particular facts of the client’s case.107 
Narrative correspondence requires a comparison of the content of 
the story told by the lawyer with the content of other stories that form 
the audience’s pool of social knowledge.108  Thus, a party’s story will 
seem plausible if it is congruent with the stock story it triggers and 
with the contextual presuppositions held by the audience.109  When a 
story fits with what the audience knows of the world from stock 
stories, it has narrative correspondence, which makes the story more 
plausible and persuasive. 
3. Narrative Fidelity
How does a legal audience decide between competing stories
when both equally enjoy internal consistency, completeness, and 
correspondence?110  According to Christopher Rideout, narrative 
fidelity is the deciding factor.111  To possess narrative fidelity, the 
audience must entertain the notion that some outcomes are more 
legitimate than others.112  Narrative fidelity is based on the audience’s 
personal evaluation of the plausibility of the story.113  Consequently, 
fidelity “persuades the audience to make a comparative judgment 
about the competing narratives based not just on stock [stories] or 
abstract legal or moral principles, but on practical judgments about 
what the larger community would deem the right thing to do in the 
case.”114  Thus, when a story has communal validity or relies on shared 
107. Id.
108. Rideout, supra note 11, at 67 (quoting JACKSON, supra note 10, at 58–59).
109. Id.; JACKSON, supra note 10, at 58–59; Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.  These
contextual presuppositions include “connotations and associations invoked by the stock 
story, which supply the party’s story with meaning.”  Yovel, supra note 12, at 130. 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that “[t]he narrative is plausible, and 
persuasive, to the extent that it bears a structural correspondence to one of these stock 
scripts or stories, not to the extent that it ‘really happened.’”  Rideout, supra note 11, at 
67. 
110. Rideout, supra note 11, at 69.
111. See id. at 69–78.
112. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 22 (quoting Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension of the Agon between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2225, 2257 (1989)). 
113. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982.
114. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 22.  The audience’s practical judgment “grasps
not the accurate objective characterization of a situation in theoretical terms but 
something far more difficult to describe.”  Rideout, supra note 11, at 74.  These practical 
judgments are a type of “intuition of experience” or “nonformal intelligence” that lead 
“many honest and sensible judgments . . . [to] express an intuition of experience which 
outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions—impressions which 
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communal norms, it enjoys narrative fidelity and will be more 
persuasive than a story that does not possess that characteristic.115  As 
a result, narrative fidelity relies on social values as much as it relies on 
reasoning.116  Thus, while the audience may consider whether the facts 
presented by the lawyer are reliable and whether the conclusions 
drawn from them seem plausible, the story’s fidelity is measured by 
the extent to which the story is consistent with the audience’s 
expectations and experience.117  The story will be more persuasive if it 
matches up with the audience’s personal sense of how the events 
should unfold and how the story should end.118  If the story has 
fidelity, the audience will instinctively want the client to receive 
justice.119 
At first glance, narrative fidelity seems very similar to, if not the 
same as, narrative correspondence.  Because a story must be 
consistent with the audience’s expectations and experiences to have 
narrative fidelity, it seems as though narrative fidelity relies upon 
stock stories to transmit mental or social models of what happened 
and what should happen.120  Narrative correspondence concerns 
whether the structural elements of the story (i.e., setting, plot, 
character, etc.) comport with the stock stories that have been 
triggered by the facts of the client’s case.121  Narrative fidelity, on the 
other hand, looks beyond whether the structural aspects of the story 
correspond with the stock story that has been triggered to whether 
the story accurately represents social reality and, therefore, provides 
a good basis for belief or action.122  Thus, narrative fidelity assesses 
the substance of the story,123 whereas narrative correspondence 
may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth.”  BURNS, supra note 31, at 209–
10 (quoting Justice Holmes in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 
598 (1907)). 
115. BURNS, supra note 31, at 217, 218; Rideout, supra note 11, at 74.
116. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982; Rideout, supra note
11, at 77.  Narrative fidelity has an evaluative component to it, which forces the audience 
to “make ‘comparative judgment[s] about the relative importance of the norms that the 
two positions represent’” when deciding which competing narrative to accept.  Rideout, 
supra note 11, at 73. 
117. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982.
118. Rideout, supra note 11, at 69 (quoting FISHER, supra note 15, at 64).
119. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 22 (quoting Winter, supra note 36, at 2257).
120. Rideout, supra note 11, at 70.
121. Id. at 67.
122. FISHER, supra note 15, at 105; Rideout, supra note 11, at 70.
123. Rideout, supra note 11, at 70, 72.  When “assessing the substantive worth of a
story,” the audience does so “not in terms of its appeal to abstract universals like the truth, 
and not in terms of its ability to translate into formal, logical propositions about social 
 202 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:2
matches the structural elements of the client’s story with those of the 
stock story that has been triggered.124 
In sum, a story possesses narrative fidelity when it comports with 
the audience’s common sense.125  Narrative fidelity is more than just 
the structural matching of the parts of the client’s story with the 
structural aspects of the stock story.  It is a consideration of whether 
the substance of the story comports with what the audience knows of 
the world based on the audience members’ personal experience. 
IV. Techniques That May Suggest a Different, More Favorable
Outcome for Your Client When Dealing With a Negative
Stock Story 
As discussed previously, when a stock story that is not favorable 
to the client is triggered by the facts of the case, and a suitable 
alternative stock story is not available, a lawyer must tell a 
counterstory that presents the client’s story from a different 
perspective.  This new perspective must be one that will not evoke the 
unfavorable embedded knowledge structures triggered by the 
unfavorable stock story.126  Counterstories use techniques that short-
circuit the inherent structure, understanding, and evaluation that is 
provided by the stock story.127  These techniques include moving from 
the initial view of the story to one that is more specific or more 
general, presenting contradictory information, taking facts out of 
context, or taking a contrarian view.128 
Two of the techniques for circumventing a stock story will be 
examined in this section.  These techniques include moving from the 
initial view of the case to one that is more specific or more general 
and presenting contradictory information.  When a writer moves from 
a more specific view of the story to a more general one, or vice versa, 
he or she is manipulating narrative rationality by emphasizing either 
narrative coherence or narrative correspondence.129  By emphasizing 
reality.”  Id. at 72.  Rather, the audience bases its comparison on “a literally indescribable 
structure of norms, events, and possibilities for action.”  Id. at 74. 
124. Id. at 70.
125. See BURNS, supra note 31, at 216; Rideout, supra note 11, at 75.
126. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300; Delgado, supra
note 53, at 2414. 
127. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267.
128. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300.
129. See generally Yovel, supra note 12.  Yovel refers to narrative coherence as
“internal coherence” and narrative correspondence as “external coherence.”  See id. at 
131.
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one over the other, a writer can tell very different stories in the 
context of a single legal case.130  With regard to presenting 
contradictory information, this section will focus on using 
characterization to make a different outcome from the negative one 
associated with the stock story seem not just legitimate, but natural. 
A. Manipulating Narrative Coherence and Narrative Correspondence to
Tell a Story That is More Favorable to Your Client
In order for a story to convince an audience, it must appeal to
embedded knowledge structures, like stock stories and myths, shared 
by members of the same community.131  But which culture’s or class’s 
stock stories are systematically imposed by the courts?132  Whose 
conventions and values do we live by?  Middle-class witnesses and 
parties typically offer testimony that can be translated into a 
conventional story form that is understood by the average white 
middle-class audience member.133  On the other hand, members of 
subcultures, often referred to as “outsiders” by academics, often do 
not share the same cultural context as “insiders.”134  Outsiders have a 
different history, a different set of background experiences and a 
different set of understandings than “insiders.”135  As a result, when an 
outsider’s actions are taken out of context, they often seem odd to 
insiders; the actions taken by the outsider are not the actions that the 
insider would have engaged in under similar circumstances.136  In fact, 
an outsider’s “failure to cast [his or her] viewpoint in the conventional 
imagery typically will result in [his or her] stories and arguments 
being treated as unintelligible if not unintelligent, the product of 
muddled thinking and an underdeveloped sense of justice.”137  
Accordingly, outsiders regularly fail to provide evidence that an 
130. Id. at 139.
131. The teller of the story and the members of the legal audience must share social
knowledge.  See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 69. 
132. Lopez, supra note 1, at 37.
133. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 69.
134. See Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
135. Id.  Stated another way, some members of the legal audience (a juror or a judge)
may not share with outsiders the “cognitive routines for presenting information in story-
coded forms.”  JACKSON, supra note 10, at 68. 
136. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.  This is the point at which “racial and other
stereotypes enter the judgmental process.  However, it is not generalized racial stereotypes 
which influence judgments, but rather racial stereotypes in relation to particular types of 
behavior, if and when such behavior is in issue within the story structure.”  JACKSON, 
supra note 10, at 69. 
137. Lopez, supra note 1, at 49.
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audience can translate into a conventional story.138  Consequently, the 
outsider’s inability to tell a conventional story may cause the audience 
to reject truthful accounts of the outsider’s actions.139  Furthermore, 
even stories that enjoy narrative coherence may be rejected by an 
audience if “the [story]teller and the audience do not share the 
norms, experiences, and assumptions necessary to draw connections 
among story elements.”140  As a result, outsiders may fear the court 
system and despair of receiving justice.141 
An audience may find it hard to accept an outsider’s story 
“without knowing more about how the situation fits into a context 
other than the ‘obvious’ insider’s one.”142  Consequently, narrowing 
legal stories to just those particular events at issue will have a 
tendency to exclude much of the evidence that outsiders rely on to 
explain their points of view.143  On the other hand, some outsiders’ 
stories can be placed in a more sympathetic light if they are set in a 
broader context rather than beginning and ending with an account of 
“the trouble” as most legal narratives generally do.144  By offering a 
wide-angle view of the social landscape in which the individual events 
occurred, the writer can provide the audience with the information 
necessary to better understand the actions of the outsider.145  This 
phenomenon allows extremely different stories to be told based on 
seemingly identical facts that compete for persuasiveness by 
appealing more to either narrative coherence or narrative 
correspondence.146  As a result, narrative coherence and narrative 
correspondence “may collide,” as emphasizing one more than the 
other “generate[s] a distinct story . . . with little or no conjunction.”147 
When broadening the context in which the story is told to extend 
beyond the particular events of the litigation, a writer emphasizes 
narrative correspondence.148  This broader context emphasizes 
narrative correspondence because correspondence relies on the 
embedded knowledge structures shared by members of a community. 
138. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 69.
139. Id. at 68.
140. Id.
141. Lopez, supra note 1, at 49.
142. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
143. Id. at 2097.
144. Id. at 2096.
145. Id.
146. Yovel, supra note 12, at 139.
147. Id. at 138–39.
148. Id. at 133–34.
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By presenting the story in a broader context, the writer hopes to tap 
into shared stock stories, myths, and experiences, or at the least, to 
present a context in which the insider can come to understand the 
outsider’s actions.  Further, by mapping the stock structure onto the 
structure of the client’s story, the writer is attempting to tap into the 
persuasive power of the stock story.  However, if a legal writer wishes 
to narrow the focus of the story to the particular facts of the case or to 
the facts relevant to the law, the writer should focus less on narrative 
correspondence and more on narrative coherence.149  Whereas 
narrative correspondence evokes connotations and associations that 
supply the story with meaning, narrative coherence “works through 
culturally-entrenched notions of sequentiality, causation, and action 
to form the story’s plot.”150  When focusing on narrative coherence 
rather than correspondence, a writer will provide a narrower context 
in which to view the facts of the case, focusing narrowly on the set of 
events that gave rise to the trouble in the case and “on what made 
those events happen.”151  No broader context will be given than that 
necessary to make sense of the story’s events and to make the story 
seem plausible to the audience.  The writer will focus on internal 
reconstructing the event and appealing to widely shared assumptions 
about how the world operates.152 
Two examples of cases in which narrative coherence and 
correspondence were manipulated in order to relate very different 
stories are included below.  The first case, Rusk v. State,153 involves the 
appeal of a conviction for rape.154  The second case, Ze’ev v. State of 
Israel,155 concerns an appeal from an Israeli’s conviction for the 
manslaughter of a Palestinian shepherd.156 
1. Rusk v. State
In Rusk, Eddie Rusk was convicted of raping a woman he had
met at a bar, identified only as Pat, in 1977.157  Pat gave Rusk a ride 
149. Id. at 132.
150. Id. at 131.
151. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.
152. Yovel, supra note 12, at 132.
153. 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
154. Id. at 625.
155. CrimA 26/89 Ze’ev v. State of Israel 43 (4)PD  631 [1989] (Isr.).
156. Yovel, supra note 12, at 132 (discussing Ze’ev v. State of Isreal, CrimA 26/89
Ze’ev v. State of Israel 43(4) PD 631 [1989] (Isr.)).    The author has been unable to obtain 
a copy of the opinion.  She has relied on Yovel’s discussion and explanation of the case in 
her explanation of Ze’ev. 
157. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
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home.158  During the course of the rape, Pat verbally voiced her lack 
of consent, but she did not physically struggle.159  On appeal, a 
majority of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
conviction on the basis that the state had failed to present evidence 
that Rusk’s behavior was sufficient to cause a reasonable fear that 
overcame Pat’s ability to physically resist.160  Judge Wilner 
dissented.161 
The majority’s technique when writing the legal narrative for 
Rusk v. State was fairly typical of legal opinions.  The traditional legal 
narrative tends to emphasize narrative coherence, focusing primarily 
on the particular events surrounding the litigation and providing only 
those contextual facts needed to understand those outcome 
determinative facts.  A traditional legal narrative begins by examining 
when the interaction between the parties began, traces the course of 
events that lead to the litigation, and ends when the parties part ways. 
Again, legal audiences tend to share white middle-class values and 
knowledge structures,162 which work their way into opinions. 
The story the majority told when relating the facts of the case 
focused narrowly on the events of the night that Pat claimed Rusk 
raped her.163  The court ventured outside those bounds only to 
provide contextual information that added to the internal consistency 
of the story that the court related.  The story began at the time and 
place that Pat and Rusk first became acquainted.164  In the first 
paragraph of the facts, the majority explains that Pat was a twenty-
two-year-old woman who was separated from her husband but not yet 
divorced.165  It goes on to explain that Pat and one of her friends 
“went bar hopping” on the night in question and that Pat met Rusk at 
the third bar she attended.166  The majority’s story goes on to provide 
details regarding Pat and Rusk’s interactions that evening, 
emphasizing facts that showed Pat’s failure to struggle and 
characterizing Rusk’s actions as lacking force.167  The majority notes 
158. Id.
159. Id. at 625–26.
160. Id. at 628.
161. Id. at 629 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
162. See supra notes 115–116, and accompanying text.
163. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.
164. Id.
165. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
166. Id.
167. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.  Rather than characterizing Rusk’s conduct as a
“light choking,” it would be characterized as a “heavy caressing.”  Id. at 2086; Rusk, 406 
A.2d at 628.
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that Rusk asked Pat for a ride home from the bar and that Pat 
agreed.168  Pat initially refused Rusk’s request that she come up to his 
apartment, but when Rusk took the keys out of the ignition, opened 
her car door and again asked her to come up, Pat told him she would, 
though she claimed to be scared of him.169  Pat then followed Rusk 
into the boarding house, up the stairs, and into Rusk’s apartment.170  
“When they got into [Rusk’s] room, he said that he had to go to the 
bathroom and left the room for a few minutes.  [Pat] made no attempt 
to leave.  When [Rusk] came back . . . [Pat] took off her slacks and 
removed his clothing because ‘he[ ] asked her to do it.”171  Pat stated 
that she was begging him not to rape her and that she was crying.172  
When she started to cry, Rusk put his hands on her throat and began 
to “lightly choke” her.173  The court later noted that this light choke 
could have been “a heavy caress” based on statements made at oral 
argument.174  The story ended when the two parted company for the 
night and Pat reported the rape to the police.175 
Throughout the majority’s opinion, the reader gets the sense that 
the judges just could not fathom Pat’s lack of physical resistance if she 
really did not wish to consent to Rusk’s advances.  This makes sense 
given the Victorian taboos and myths that have traditionally 
surrounded rape,176 as well as the fact that rape laws conform to the 
male experience of violence rather than to the female’s experience of 
invasion, fear, and humiliation.177  “The law expects a raped woman, 
like a battered wife, to behave like a man when threatened: to try to 
defend herself even at the risk of death.  The law demands that a 
woman behave like a reasonable man and fight back.”178 
Consequently, as most judges in 1979 tended to be men, “[i]t is 
probably hard for most men . . . to imagine not fighting back when 
attacked unless their passivity results from a weakness of will or a 
168. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 625–26.
172. Id. at 626.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 628.
175. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.
176. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 633 (1979) (Wilner, J., dissenting).
177. CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 112 (1992).
178. Id. at 113.  Rape laws do “not demand that a man behave like a reasonable
woman and understand the difference between consent and coercion, between the words 
‘yes’ and ‘no.’”  Id. 
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failure of nerve, neither of which are remediable in law.”179  The social 
bias against rape victims and the judges’ inability to comprehend Pat’s 
lack of resistance meant that the court reversed Rusk’s conviction for 
rape.  Essentially, the majority was unable to understand Pat’s 
motivation in not physically resisting Rusk. 
Furthermore, because the judges were unable to comprehend 
Pat’s failure to struggle, they themselves struggled to make sense of 
the events of that night.  In an effort to create internal consistency 
with regard to most of the events of the story, the majority includes 
the fact that Pat was separated from her husband but not yet 
divorced,180 the relevance of which is unclear.181  However, the next 
fact the majority mentions is that Pat and her friend were “bar 
hopping.”182  When Pat’s marital status is considered with regard to 
the majority’s characterization of her behavior that night as “bar 
hopping,” its relevance becomes clear.183  The combination of these 
two “facts” suggests Pat’s motivation that night by creating the 
“underlying suspicion, for which there is absolutely no support in the 
record, that Pat was somehow ‘on the make.’”184  This “context” 
appeals to society’s widely held assumptions about how a woman 
trolling the bars looking for a man to bed behaves.  This “context” 
shades the reader’s understanding of Pat’s subsequent actions in 
agreeing to give Rusk a ride home, following him up to his apartment, 
remaining in the apartment while he left the room, taking off her 
clothes at his request, and engaging in sexual acts.  The fact that she 
was initially “on the make” causes Pat’s actions to appear consensual 
despite her repeated verbal objections. 
The majority’s note that the testimony of two of Rusk’s friends 
“painted the episode in a manner more favorable to the accused”185 is 
also designed to suggest that Pat was “on the make.”  Why else would 
the majority make such a statement when it goes on to acknowledge 
that it need not recite the testimony of Rusk’s friends because the 
court was “obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable 
179. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
180. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
181. Id. at 633 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 625.
183. Id. at 632 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 626.  Presumably the evidence that favors Rusk’s version of the fact is that
his friends observed him “walking down the street arm-in-arm” with a woman.  State v. 
Rusk, 424 A.2d at 720, 723 (Md. 1981).  One friend, David Carroll, testified that the 
woman “was hanging all over him.”  Id.  He also testified that he was “fairly certain” that 
the woman was Pat.  Id. 
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to the prosecution”?186  What need was there for the majority to make 
the initial statement?  None, unless the majority was trying to create 
consistency between the facts of the case and its unstated version of 
what happened. 
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, took a different 
approach.  Rather than narrowly focusing on the trouble between Pat 
and Rusk, Judge Wilner put Pat and Rusk’s story in a broader 
context.187  In addition to clarifying some of the facts presented by the 
majority and supplementing other facts regarding the events of the 
night in question, Judge Wilner zoomed out to provide a more 
expansive view of the case and offered a more panoramic opening 
shot of the social landscape in which this individual rape took place.188  
In an effort to allow the audience (which remember is primarily male) 
to understand Pat’s actions, the dissenting judge showed how the 
circumstances in which Pat found herself and her response were 
typical of women who are raped. 
How did Judge Wilner make Pat’s circumstances seem 
characteristic of those experienced by rape victims?  First, the judge 
noted that “[n]early half of [all] rapes occur when this one did, 
between 8:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m.”189  He also disclosed that “as in 
[Pat’s] case, approximately one-third of rape victims had come into 
contact with their assailant voluntarily.”190  These statements address 
two often biasing facts in rape cases and implicitly suggest that it is 
normal for a woman, like Pat, to get raped late at night and for her to 
know her attacker. 
Next, Judge Wilner addressed Pat’s failure to struggle.  He began 
the discussion by revealing that law enforcement agencies throughout 
the country advise women not to fight back against their attackers 
because this increases the risk of serious bodily harm.191  Additionally, 
the judge made it clear that “because most women’s experience and 
expertise with violence tends to be minimal, they are unlikely to 
engage in physical combat.”192  He disclosed that the types of 
resistance most often employed by rape victims are verbal resistance 
186. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 626.
187. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
188. Id. at 2095.
189. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095; Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634–635 (Wilner, J.,
dissenting). 
192. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, 2 THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, at 4 (1978)). 
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and other forms of passive resistance, such as “crying, being slow to 
respond, feigning an inability to understand instructions or telling the 
rapist they are pregnant, diseased or injured.”193  Finally, Judge 
Wilner pointed out that, of the 12% of women who fight their 
attackers, 71% of the victims were physically injured, with 40% 
requiring hospitalization or medical treatment.194  The judge 
recognized that “[t]hese results indicate one possible danger of the 
popular notion (and some [legal] requirements) that a victim of an 
attack should resist to her utmost.”195  Although the wide-angle view 
of the case presented by Judge Wilner “puts the events before the 
court in a broader context than that normally invoked by legal 
narratives,”196 this context allowed the audience to better understand 
Pat’s reactions and to feel more sympathy for her than did the 
majority’s story, which primarily focused on the events on the night of 
the rape. 
2. Ze’ev v. State of Israel197
Ze’ev was a Jewish settler in Shilo, a settlement located in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank.198  He was a shepherd.199  In 1988, Ze’ev 
was convicted of manslaughter for shooting and killing one 
Palestinian shepherd and wounding another in an incident that took 
place on the outskirts of Shilo.200  The Palestinian shepherds had been 
unarmed.201  On appeal, Ze’ev argued that he was justified in fearing 
aggression from the Palestinian shepherds and shooting so as to scare 
away “what he reasonably perceived to be a threat to his home.”202  
Additionally, Ze’ev argued that, prior to opening fire, he had shouted 
at the Palestinian shepherds to go away and that they had responded 
by cursing at him and moving in his direction.203 
193. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095; Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
194. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
197. CrimA 26/89 Ze’ev v. State of Israel 43(4) PD 631 [1989] (Isr.).  The author has
been unable to obtain a copy of the Ze’ev opinion.  Therefore, in her discussion of Ze’ev, 
she has relied on Jonathan Yovel’s description of the case in his article titled Running 
Backs, Wolves, and Other Fatalities: How Manipulations of Narrative Coherence in Legal 
Opinions Marginalize Violent Death. See generally Yovel, supra note 12. 
198. Yovel, supra note 12, at 132.
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The majority opinion is a lesson in narrative coherence.  It focuses 
narrowly on the “trouble” between Ze’ev and the two Palestinian 
shepherds.  It reconstructs the immediate events leading to the 
shooting,204 examining the “internal sequential arrangement of the” 
story.205  The majority relied on expert ballistic evidence in concluding 
that Ze’ev, “in order to have fired the good many rounds that he in 
fact did, began shooting immediately, taking no precautionary 
steps.”206  The court reasoned that, based on Ze’ev’s “own account, 
the very short time span between first contact and the shooting—less 
than a minute—could not have allowed for the preliminary steps he 
claimed to have taken, such as shouting warnings, firing in the air, 
etc.”207  The majority’s decision “focuses on the narrative’s internal 
integrity,”208 evaluating its temporal unity and coming to a decision 
based on “widely-shared assumptions about how the material worlds 
work,” particularly with regard to the passage of time and the 
sequencing of events.209  The majority found Ze’ev’s version of events 
to lack temporal unity—and thus plausibility—because the events 
could not have occurred the way he said they did based on the short 
period of time that had passed between Ze’ev’s first encounter with 
the Palestinians and when he shot them. 
The dissenting justice, on the other hand, did not narrowly focus 
on the trouble between Ze’ev and the Palestinian shepherds.210  
Rather, the dissenting justice put the shooting in a broader context by 
providing a more panoramic opening shot of the social landscape in 
which this particular shooting took place.211  The minority opinion told 
“the story of a secluded settlement populated by infants and women 
and vacant of most of its men amidst a vast, menacing periphery.”212  
It “cite[s] several security threats and official notices to that effect.”213  
It goes on to present evidence of Ze’ev’s “generally mild character” 
and accepts his assertion that he attempted to drive the Palestinians 
204. Id.
205. Id. at 131.
206. Id. at 132.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 136.
209. Id. at 132.
210. See id. at 132–33.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 132.
213. Id. at 132–33.
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away verbally and by shooting into the air before he shot in their 
direction.214 
Though the additional facts about the settlement being secluded 
and populated by women and children, the existence of many security 
threats, and Ze’ev’s character are irrelevant in terms of the immediate 
events surrounding the shooting, these facts are useful with regard to 
the dissent’s creation of a context that is recognizable to the audience. 
While the dissent does not indicate that Ze’ev was aware of the 
existence of the security threats,215 his lack of knowledge is not 
important.  The seclusion of the settlement and the existence of the 
threats are important for a few reasons.  First, this context creates 
sympathy for Ze’ev and the situation in which he found himself 
(confronted by two potentially hostile Arabs in the outskirts of a 
secluded Israeli settlement).  Second, it allows the audience to feel 
the “sense of urgency and anxiety” that Ze’ev presumably felt when 
confronted by two Palestinians outside Shilo.216  Finally, and most 
important, the dissenting justice’s “reconstruction of events . . . uses 
[narrative correspondence] to weave a story of its own.”217  The 
broader social context offered by the dissenting justice and the 
reconstructed facts create a setting for the story of the shooting that 
corresponds with an inherent knowledge structure with which most 
Israelis are familiar—the myth of Tel-Hai.218 
The Tel-Hai story is a myth of Zionism that imparts a moral—
”beware the seemingly innocuous stranger approaching a secluded 
dwelling, especially if the former is an Arab and the latter Israeli.”219  
The Tel-Hai myth tells of a secluded Galilee stronghold that was 
attacked by Arabs who had initially pretended to be peaceful and so 
were admitted to the stronghold.220  The Arabs then assaulted and 
destroyed the stronghold, killing eight military men and women who 
defended it.221  Much like the United States’ defeat at The Alamo, the 
military defeat and political situation that followed the Tel-Hai attack 
had a solidifying effect, causing Israelis to identify with one another 
214. Id.
215. Id. at 133.
216. Id.  The dissenting justice manages to omit Ze’ev admission that he did not feel
fear when he saw the Palestinians.  Id. 
217. Id.
218. See id. at 133–36.
219. Id. at 134.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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and unite as one people.222  The Tel-Hai myth “became an 
interpretive key for [Israelis to use when evaluating] future 
experience, transcending” history.223 
The story the dissenting justice tells fits closely with the Tel-Hai 
myth.224  While the Tel-Hai myth is never explicitly mentioned in the 
minority opinion,225 the dissenting justice’s “tacit invocation of [the 
Tel-Hai myth] underlies his story of the Ze’ev shooting.”226  In fact, 
“[t]he minority opinion in Ze’ev owes much of its persuasiveness to 
reliance on [the] tacit invocation of Tel-Hai as a mythical parable—
but only among” those members of the audience who share cultural 
knowledge of the myth.227  Members of the audience who share 
cultural knowledge of the myth “are expected to perform the 
associative link from the narrative pattern to several ‘baits’ or 
‘anchors,’ thus realizing what the story in Ze’ev is really all about.”228  
These baits or anchors were the dissenting justice’s emphasis on how 
secluded Shilo was, the numerous security threats that existed at the 
time of the shooting, and “the menace emanating from the victims 
rather than from the perpetrator.”229  These facts invoke, without 
explicitly referencing, stories of Arab aggressors invading secluded 
Israeli communities, specifically the Tel-Hai myth.230  The implicit 
invocation of the myth supplies the Ze’ev case “with meaning in a 
manner powerful enough to preempt other factual findings,”231 
particularly those with regard to the extremely short period of time 
that elapsed between Ze’ev’s initial encounter with the Palestinians 
and his shooting in their direction.  This is due to the fact that “most 
222. Id. at 133, 135.  “Gettysburg,” “Pearl Harbor,” “D-Day,” and “September 11th” 
(or “9/11”) are other American examples of “code-names” like The Alamo that instantly 
bring to mind “commonly shared stories of bloody events” that have become “the myths 
that constitute and solidify collective identity.”  Id. at 133.  Like the Tel-Hai story, these 
myths also impart a moral less.  Id. at 134.  For instance, “in American consciousness, 
Pearl Harbor would function as an instant invocation of the traitorous belligerence of 
foreigners and an imperative justification for righteous aggression no matter its precise 
historiography.”  Id. 
223. Id.  In fact, the Tel-Hai attack has become so mythologized that “Israeli
schoolchildren are sometimes surprised to find out that the place Tel-Hai actually exists.” 
Id. 
224. Id. at 135.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 134.
227. Id. at 135.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 133.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 135.
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of the [audience], though decidedly not all, would share the common-
sensical knowledge of what happens when menacing strangers emerge 
from those unknown stretches beyond civilization [and approach] a 
secluded dwelling.”232  However, those members of the audience who 
do not share the Tel-Hai myth, outsiders like the Palestinian victims 
in this case, “would be perplexed by the causation implied by the 
minority’s story, because that relies on cultural expectations coded in 
mythical patterns that they do not share and that are not spelled out 
in the narrative itself.”233 
“[T]he minority opinion in Ze’ev is replete with historical and 
mythological layers” that form a context that is much more expansive 
than that provided by the majority opinion.234  But, though these 
references are purposeful and proactive, they are not explicit.  The 
dissenting judge does not explicitly reference Tel-Hai because he 
does not wish to engage the audience in a dialogue about the myth 
and the applicability of its moral lesson in Ze’ev.235  The dissenting 
judge does not provide “an opportunity for reflection or exchange. . . . 
[Rather,] [t]he reader is counted on to form certain responses” as a 
result of the minority opinion’s implicit allusions to the Tel-Hai 
myth.236  “The majority opinion [on the other hand,] does not neglect 
context.”237  It just narrows the context in which the shooting occurred 
to that which immediately surrounded the shooting rather than 
focusing on a broader context that allowed for the manipulation of 
the facts.  “To an extent, the majority employed a formalistic 
approach, signifying that no amount of importation of—or reliance 
on—external cultural input may change its . . . approach to 
facticity.”238  The bald facts demonstrated that the events could not 
have occurred the way Ze’ev claimed they occurred.  The majority 
recognized that Ze’ev’s story lacked temporal unity and did not allow 
a broader view of society in the West Bank to affect or alter its view 
of the bald facts.  Consequently, the majority and minority opinions 
each provided a comprehensive account of what happened during the 
shooting.  However, the stories that the majority and minority 
opinions told varied widely due to the justices emphasizing different 





236. Id. at 135–36.
237. Id. at 136.
238. Id.
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emphasized narrative coherence, and focused on the internal 
consistency of the elements of the story and temporal unity, it 
concluded that Ze’ev had committed manslaughter.  The minority 
opinion, on the other hand, emphasized narrative correspondence, 
linking Ze’ev’s story with the moral lessons imparted by the Tel-Hai 
myth.  These lessons provided Ze’ev “with a probable expectation of 
aggression” from the Palestinian shepherds and “preempt[ed] 
responsibility” for his shooting the Palestinians and killing one of 
them.239 
3. Summary
The Rusk and Ze’ev cases demonstrate that a lawyer can
manipulate narrative coherence and narrative correspondence to tell 
extremely different stories based on the same set of facts.  A focus on 
narrative coherence emphasizes the immediate facts that lead to the 
litigation.  It underscores the need not only for the facts to match up 
with one another, but also for the parts of the story to fit together. 
When the facts match up and the parts of the story fit together, the 
story seems plausible.  On the other hand, a focus on narrative 
correspondence broadens the social context in which the immediate 
facts are situated.  This may be done to assist an insider audience in 
comprehending an outsider’s actions.  It may also be done to tap into 
embedded knowledge structures that the insider audience shares in 
an effort to avoid a problem with the narrative coherence of a story. 
Such problems would include when the client’s claimed facts are not 
plausible because they do not entirely match up. 
The Rusk case illustrates how a wide angle approach to the 
context in which a case arises might work to the advantage of 
outsiders.  “[T]he claims of outsiders are often not heard in law 
because the experiences and reactions and beliefs and values that 
outsiders bring to the law are not easily processed in the traditional 
structures of legal narratives.”240 By offering the legal audience a 
broader context in which to evaluate the events of the case, however, 
a lawyer may provide the audience with sufficient information to 
understand why an outsider acted in a different manner than how the 
insider audience would have acted.241  Thus, emphasizing narrative 
correspondence over narrative coherence can sometimes be an 
effective technique when a lawyer represents an outsider whose 
239. Id.
240. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2097.
241. Id. at 2096.
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actions may not be readily comprehensible by a white, middle-class 
audience. 
A panoramic view of the social context in which a case arises, 
which emphasizes narrative correspondence, “may not always . . . 
work to the advantage of outsiders.”242  The minority opinion in Ze’ev 
provides an example where the focus on narrative coherence 
benefited the insider party rather than the victims, who were 
outsiders.  The provision of a broader social context was used in the 
minority opinion to circumvent the facts because Ze’ev’s story lacked 
internal consistency with regard to the passage of time and the 
sequence of events.  This lack of consistency led the majority to 
conclude that Ze’ev was unjustified in his shooting of the Palestinians 
and to convict him of manslaughter.  The minority opinion, on the 
other hand, tacitly appealed to a stock story that supported Ze’ev’s 
expectation of aggression from the Palestinians and excused him from 
shooting them.  The dissenting justice buried argument in the 
expanded contextual facts that were supplied and circumvented the 
restraints on the meaning that were given to the bald facts as they 
existed.243 
B. Drawing on Narrative Fidelity to Create Conflict Between the Client’s
Character and Audience Expectation Regarding How Story Should End
Narrative coherence demands that the various elements of a story
work together for a story to be persuasive.  These elements include 
character, conflict, plot, point of view, setting, theme, voice, and 
style.244  Characters, arguably the most important element of a story,245 
are “free agents, with minds of their own . . . who engage in the ‘what 
happened and why’ of the story.”246  Stock stories cast people, 
institutions, and ideas as characters, each filling a particular 
archetypal role.247  Accordingly, characters function as “trope[s] for 
human identity.”248  When a particular stock story is triggered, the 
audience expects to encounter a stock of characters, including heroes, 
242. Id. at 2096–97.
243. See Lopez, supra note 1, at 33.
244. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 268; see Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens:  The
Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING:  J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 137 (2008); J. 
Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction 
Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459, 466 (2001). 
245. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 274.  See Chestek, supra note 244, at 142.
246. Carolyn Grose, Storytelling across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from
Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N. LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 43 (2010). 
247. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 187; Edwards, supra note 33, at 890.
248. Grose, supra note 246, at 43.
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villains, tricksters, mentors, kings, mothers, demons, sages, children, 
companions, gatekeepers, damsels in distress, shape shifters, and 
clowns.249  And, just as with “plots, characters tend to register with [an 
audience] as familiar, each one is expected to embody one or more 
general truths”250 about people in general or the world. 
“Although stock stories may cast people, institutions, and ideas in 
archetypal roles that serve as templates for characters, the lawyer still 
needs to develop those characters so that they seem true to the reader 
rather than a two-dimensional cardboard cutout.”251  To achieve 
narrative coherence, and ultimately narrative rationality, the litigants 
must “emerge as fully realized individuals . . . rather than cardboard 
prototypes.”252  Consequently, the characters need to be developed so 
that they feel real to the audience.253 
Character can be developed in numerous ways.  It can be 
established directly by revealing an individual’s thoughts, needs, 
dreams, fears, weaknesses, experiences, circumstances, and 
motivations.254  Character can also be demonstrated by “describing 
[an individual’s] physical ‘appearance, clothes, possessions, body 
language, etc., which act as indices of class, character, status, and 
social milieu.’”255  Character can be developed indirectly as well.256  It 
can be developed indirectly through action and dialogue.257  For 
instance, how an individual responds to a conflict or struggles to 
overcome adversity reveals something about his or her character.258  
This is true with regard to what the individual says as well.259  
However, though it is important to develop a character, when 
249. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 275; Edwards, supra note 33, at 890; see also Ruth
Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the 
Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 
775, 778 (2006). 
250. Grose, supra note 246, at 43.
251. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 276.
252. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 23.
253. Id. at 30.
254. Id. at 30–31.
255. Id. at 31.  With regard to descriptions of body language, “there is a difference
between persons making eye contact and a person becoming aware that he or she is the 
object of someone’s unblinking stare.  The former suggests a moment of shared intimacy, 
the latter an uncomfortable intrusion.”  Id. 
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 275; Foley & Robbins, supra note 244, at 470.
259. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 31.  That dialogue is a good measure of character
is demonstrated by the ancient Greek adage, “Speak, so that I may see you.”  Id. 
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engaged in character development, a lawyer should avoid information 
overload.260  Rather, 
character can be developed economically and elegantly 
through use of selected details . . . Effective characterization 
captures appropriate details in images, or in careful 
descriptions, often through the selection of vivid details. 
These enable the reader to pull the pieces together into a 
composition—to construct the whole from the closely 
observed details, and thus, to compose the character’s 
character.261 
Furthermore, an audience can deduce more than just who an 
individual is from his or her character.  An audience can deduce why 
a character has acted in a particular fashion and predict how that 
individual is likely to act in future circumstances.  An audience can 
deduce why a character has acted in a particular manner by figuring 
out the character’s motivations.  This provides an explanation for 
what has already happened in the story.262  Additionally, character can 
foreshadow what will happen next.263  The audience will be able to 
explain what has already happened and predict what will happen by 
“draw[ing] upon . . . stock stories, metaphors, and psychological 
schema to look forward as well as to look back into the past.”264 
Recall that narrative coherence requires that the facts and the 
client’s story match up.265  What this means is, with regard to 
character, narrative coherence demands that an individual act 
consistently with his or her character.266  Thus, for narrative coherence 
to exist, the character of the individual and the conduct that 
individual engages in must comport with each other.267  The individual 
must conduct him or herself in a manner consistent with his or her 
character in order for narrative coherence to exist.  For example, if 
villains suddenly profess to be heroes, “we need a lot of persuasive 
260. See Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEGAL WRITING: J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 229, 263 (2006).  According to Meyer, “an overload of 
psychological description and the baggage of too many identifying details may detract 
from effective characterization, especially in legal narratives.”  Id. 
261. Id.
262. Id. at 264.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 33.
266. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 981.
267. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 33, 36.
 2012] WHAT IF THE BIG BAD WOLF … WAS JUST MISUNDERSTOOD? 219 
sub-plots about their lives to explain the transformation.”268  If such 
subplots are missing, the villian’s behavior does not make sense, the 
story is not believable, and its persuasive effect falls apart. 
When dealing with a stock story that has a resolution that does 
not favor his or her client, a lawyer may be able to use the need for 
narrative coherence with regard to character, the character’s conduct, 
and the resolution of the story to the client’s benefit.  By carefully 
developing the character of his or her client in a way that creates 
friction between who the character is and how the character is expected 
to act according to the stock story, a lawyer may be able to change the 
traditional resolution of the stock story that was triggered into one 
that is more favorable to the client.  In order to change the outcome 
of the story in a manner that is plausible, the lawyer must develop the 
character of the client in a way that makes the new, unexpected 
behavior more believable than the behavior originally suggested by 
the stock story because it is more consistent with the character’s 
personality.  The lawyer would need to demonstrate that this was the 
only plausible course of action she could take given who the client is. 
There was nothing else the client could do—any other action would 
have been counter to whom and what she is.  Thus, a lawyer must 
develop the client’s character in such a way that the outcome the 
lawyer is seeking seems more natural than that associated with the 
stock story simply because of who the party is and how the party 
would act. 
Below is an example of how character development and narrative 
fidelity can be used to circumvent the negative assumptions and 
outcomes associated with a stock story.  In the television series Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer,269 the main character, Buffy Summer, fights 
Dracula in an episode titled Buffy vs. Dracula.270  Since the episode 
occurred at the beginning of season five, the creator of the series 
needed to find a way for the show to follow the Dracula storyline 
without Buffy becoming a vampire.  Furthermore, the creator of the 
show needed to do this in a way that was true to the “Buffyverse.”271  
Following the discussion of Buffy vs. Dracula,272 this section explores 
268. Johansen, This is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 981.
269. Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Mutant Enemy television broadcast 1997–2003).
270. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy vs. Dracula (Mutant Enemy television broadcast
Sept. 26, 2000). 
271. Buffyverse, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 20, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffyverse.
The Buffyverse, also known as the “Whedonverse” or “Slayerverse,” is the fictional 
universe in which the television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer is set.  Id. 
272. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270.
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appealing to narrative fidelity by creating friction between the 
character of a client who is a battered woman and the negative 
assumptions and beliefs associated with being a battered woman in 
order to make a more favorable outcome seem natural. 
1. Buffy vs. Dracula273
Most members of Western society are familiar with Bram Stoker’s
novel Dracula.274  We know generally what details to expect when we 
see a remake or loose adaptation of the story.  The general plot line 
involves Dracula, a vampire, seducing women and turning them into 
vampires.  Because he puts them under his thrall, his female victims 
do not resist his efforts but cooperate willingly.  Dracula’s female 
victims try to hide what has happened to them from their loved ones. 
His victims willingly go to Dracula when he wants them.  When he 
seduces Mina Harker and begins her transformation into a vampire, 
VanHelsing, an older gentleman with knowledge of the occult, and 
Jonathan Harker, Mina’s husband, fight and kill Dracula to save 
Mina.275 
In fact, the Dracula story is so ingrained in our culture that even 
when a story features vampires, whether they are Dracula or not, we 
know what to expect.  Dracula serves as a myth, or cognitive short 
cut, regarding vampires.  We know that vampires drink blood; they 
only come out at night; they tend to travel in a crate or other coffin-
like container filled with their native soil; they have special powers 
that allow them to turn into a bat, wolf, or mist, and to hold their 
victims in thrall so the victim will cooperate with them; they 
sometimes transform their victims into vampires; and they can be 
killed by staking them through the heart. 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer was a television series that ran from 
1997 to 2003.276  The main character was Buffy Summers, a petite 
blond young woman who, at first glance, seemed like any other 
teenager.  She liked to shop, date boys, and hang out with her friends. 
But Buffy had a secret.  She was the “chosen one.” She was the one 
girl in all the world who had been chosen to fight vampires and other 
forces of darkness.  She was more than “just a girl.”  She possessed a 
mystical power that made her faster, stronger than other people.  She 
was the slayer. 
273. Id.
274. BRAM STOKER, DRACULA (1897).
275. Id.
276. Buffy the Vampire Slayer, supra note 269.
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Throughout the series, Buffy was portrayed as a physically and 
emotionally strong, smart, witty, independent young woman who 
took her responsibilities as the slayer seriously. She repeatedly saves 
her classmates, her teachers, her mother, her friends, her boyfriends, 
and even the world from vampires and demons.  And, as is inevitable 
for a vampire slayer, she encounters Dracula in an episode in season 
five titled Buffy vs. Dracula.277 
a. Synopsis of the Episode278
The episode begins by showing Buffy lying in bed with her
boyfriend, Riley Finn. Unable to sleep, Buffy quietly gets out of bed 
and goes out to patrol the cemetery.279  After staking a vampire, she 
returns to bed with Riley.280  The next day, Buffy and her friends are 
enjoying a day at the beach until Willow, a witch-in-training, 
manipulates the elements to magically ignite the barbecue.281  A 
sudden thunderstorm erupts, forcing them to seek shelter from the 
rain.282  Willow objects that she did not cause the storm.283  The scene 
then switches to two delivery men in front of a residence; they are 
unloading a large crate.  One of the delivery men drops the end of the 
crate and it cracks open a bit, expelling dirt.  The man says, “Look at 
this.  The guy’s carting dirt around!  Dirt.  Man, rich people are . . ..”284  
His words are cut short when a clawed hand breaks through the wood 
and attacks him.  The scene fades away as the hand starts toward the 
other delivery man. 
The next time we see Buffy, she is back in the cemetery fighting 
another vampire.285  The fight is a lively one.  A man with dark eyes 
materializes from mist, watching Buffy and the anonymous vampire 
fight from a distance.286  Buffy stakes the vampire.287  As she struts 
away, clearly pleased with herself, she slows down and looks around. 
277. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270.
278. Some parts of the episode have been omitted from this synopsis.  This synopsis
only focuses on the parts of the episode that either correspond with the Dracula story line 
or develop Buffy’s character.  Extraneous materials have been ignored. 
279. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270, at 00:01–00:25.
280. Id. at 00:26–1:20.
281. Id. at 02:15–3:25.
282. Id. at 3:27–3:49.
283. Id. at 3:40.
284. Id. at 3:50–4:21.
285. Id. at 4:24–4:26.
286. Id. at 7:24–7:55.
287. Id. at 7:56–7:58.
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The man says to her, “Very impressive hunt.  Such power.”288  Buffy 
responds, “That was no hunt.  That was just another day on the job. 
Care to step up for some overtime?”289  The man, who has long dark 
hair and wears a black cape that is red on the inside, tells her, “We 
are not going to fight.”290  Buffy replies, “Do you know what a slayer 
is?”291  The man responds, “Do you?”292  “Who are you?”293 Buffy 
demands.  He answers, “I apologize.  I assumed you knew.  I’m 
Dracula.”294  Buffy exclaims, “Get out!”295  The scene then switches to 
the credits. 
When we return from the credits, Willow and Xander, Buffy’s 
stalwart companions, are walking through the cemetery chatting. 
Xander asks Willow if she wants “to see if Buffy’s hanging around the 
headstones?”296  The scene returns to Buffy and Dracula.  Buffy is 
saying, “So let me get this straight.  You’re Dracula.  The guy, the 
count?”297  He responds, “I am.”298  She mocks him, “And you’re sure 
this isn’t just some fan boy thing?  ‘Cause I’ve fought more than a 
couple pimply overweight vamps who called themselves Lestat.”299  
Dracula tells her that she knows who he is just as he knows who she 
is.  When she expresses surprise, Dracula informs Buffy that she is 
known throughout the world.  He states that he came to Sunnydale to 
meet “the renowned killer.”  Buffy expresses her displeasure, 
explaining that she prefers “the term slayer.”  She reminds Dracula 
that she’s the good guy.  He responds, “Perhaps, but your power is 
rooted in darkness.  You must feel it.”  Buffy replies, “No.  You know 
what I feel?  Bored.”300  She lunges forward to stake him in the heart. 
Dracula turns into mist and reappears behind her.  When she tries to 
stake him a second time, Dracula again turns into mist.  Buffy chides, 
“Okay, that’s cheating.”301  As Buffy spins around, looking furtively 
for Dracula, Willow and Xander approach.  Buffy tells them to get 
288. Id. at 8:02–8:17.
289. Id. at 8:18–8:25.
290. Id. at 8:26–8:28.
291. Id. at 8:29–8:30.
292. Id. at 8:31–8:32.
293. Id. at 8:35–8:36.
294. Id. at 8:38–8:44.
295. Id. at 8:46–8:47.
296. Id. at 8:53–9:22.
297. Id. at 9:26–9:32.
298. Id. at 9:33–9:34.
299. Id. at 9:35–9:42.
300. Id. at 9:45–10:36.
301. Id. at 10:37–10:47.
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out of there, but it is too late.  She sees Dracula starting to materialize 
behind them and warns them.  They turn around and see Dracula. 
Xander immediately starts mocking Dracula’s attire and accent. 
Buffy intervenes, “Xander, I’m pretty sure that’s Dracula.”302  Dracula 
declares, “This is not the time.  I will see you soon.”303  He then turns 
into a bat and flies away. 
The next time Dracula sees Buffy, he has entered her bedroom as 
mist.  When he coalesces into a man, Buffy wakes up and sits up. 
After Dracula tells her that she is magnificent, Buffy replies, “I bet 
you say that before you bite all the girls.”  Dracula and Buffy 
exchange some words, then Dracula orders Buffy to pull her hair 
back.  Buffy complies, but says, “This isn’t how I usually fight.  You 
think you can just waft in here with your music video wind and your 
hypno eyes.”  Dracula approaches her and sits next to her on her bed. 
He runs his finger over the scar on her neck and comments, “You 
have been tasted.”  Buffy will not look at Dracula, but says, “He 
was . . ..”  Dracula interrupts her, “Unworthy.  He let you go.  But the 
embrace, his bite, you remember.”304  When Buffy objects, Dracula 
orders, “Do not fight.  I can feel your hunger.”  He then bites her 
neck.  When Buffy wakes in the morning, she gets dressed.  She is 
standing in front of a mirror looking at her reflection.  When she pulls 
her hair back, she sees the puncture wounds from Dracula’s fangs. 
She grabs a scarf and ties it around her neck to hide the marks. 
Later, Buffy allows Xander, who has become a sort of Renfield-
like character under Dracula’s power, to lead her to Dracula’s 
dwelling.  When Buffy and Dracula meet, Dracula tells Buffy, “I 
knew you’d come.”305  Buffy asks, “Why?  Because I’m under your 
thrall?”306  She whips out a stake and says, “Well, guess again, pal!”307 
However, when Dracula orders her to put the stake down, she does so 
automatically.  “Right,” she says, “that was not you.  I did that.  I did 
that because I wanted to.  Maybe I should rethink that thrall thing.”308  
Dracula approaches her and Buffy tells him, “Stay away from me.”309  
Dracula mocks her, “Are you afraid I will bite you?  Slayer, that’s 
302. Id. at 10:48–11:22.
303. Id. at 11:31–11:37.
304. Id. at 20:31–22:23.
305. Id. at 30:06–30:07.
306. Id. at 30:12–30:15.
307. Id. at 30:16–30:17.
308. Id. at 30:20–30:41.
309. Id. at 31:22–31:23.
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why you came.”310  Buffy objects, “No.  Last night, it’s not going to 
happen again.”311 “Stop me,” Dracula says, “Stake me.”312  “Any 
minute now,” Buffy tells him, though not convincingly.313  They 
exchange words and Buffy tells Dracula that her friends are there.314  
He acknowledges that they are present, but seems unconcerned about 
them.  Dracula says, “You will have eternity to discover yourself.  But 
first, a little taste.”315  Buffy tells him, “I won’t let you.”316  He looks 
meaningfully at her and says, “I didn’t mean for me.”317  Rolling up his 
sleeve and slicing his wrist so that blood wells up out of it, Dracula 
says, “All those years fighting us, your powers so near to our own. 
And you’ve never once wanted to know what it is we fight for.  Never 
even a taste.”318  When Buffy voices concern about becoming a 
vampire if she drinks his blood, Dracula informs her that he had not 
drank enough of her blood for her to change.319  He holds his wrist out 
to her.  She takes it, puts her lips to his wrist, and begins to taste his 
blood.  As she does this, he says to her, “Find it.  The darkness.  Find 
your true nature.”320 
As she drinks Dracula’s blood, a montage of images flashes 
through Buffy’s mind.  She sees several images of the first slayer, 
blood rushing through a vein, and many images of herself chasing and 
staking vampires.  “Wow,” she says and knocks Dracula across the 
room, “that was gross.”321  Dracula stands up and says, “You are 
resisting.”322  “Looks like,” Buffy counters.323  “Come here,” Dracula 
orders, “come to me.”324  Buffy responds, “You know, I really think 
310. Id. at 31:24–31:33.
311. Id. at 31:34–31:40.
312. Id. at 31:40–31:44.
313. Id. at 31:45–31:46.
314. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270, at 31:47–31:59.
315. Xander, who is under Dracula’s power, is eating bugs like the lunatic Renfield
from the novel and trying to prevent Riley and Giles, Buffy’s watcher and teacher, from 
interfering with Dracula’s plan.  Id. at 25:21–26:00.  While searching the mansion, Giles 
falls into a pit with Dracula’s three sisters and seems to fall under their thrall, much like 
Jonathan Harker in the novel.  Id. at 33:30–34:10. 
316. Id. at 32:00–32:41.
317. Id. at 32:45–32:47.
318. Id. at 34:12–34:30.
319. Id. at 34:34–34:38.
320. Id. at 34:35–35:39.
321. Id. at 35:00–35:55.
322. Id. at 35:57–36:00.
323. Id. at 36:01–36:03.
324. Id. at 36:04–36:07.
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the thrall has gone out of our relationship.”325  Dracula demands, 
“What is this?”326  Buffy answers, “My true nature.  Want a taste?”327  
She and Dracula then begin to fight.  Dracula turns into mist and 
begins to coalesce on the other side of the room.  Buffy runs in that 
direction and grabs the stake she earlier laid on the table as she 
passes by.  When Dracula takes form, Buffy stakes him through the 
heart and ask, “How do you like my darkness now?”328  Dracula turns 
to dust as Riley, Xander, and Giles enter the room. 
b. How Friction Between Buffy’s Character and Her Behavior
Undermined the Stock Ending of the Dracula Story
From the scene in which Buffy is lying restlessly in bed with Riley
to the scene when Dracula shifts into a bat,329 the writer is establishing 
some necessary story elements.  First, the writer is establishing the 
plotline of the episode by introducing Dracula and having him 
encounter Buffy.  The plotline triggers the vampire myth as well as 
the more specific Dracula story line.  When the delivery men unload 
the large crate at night during a storm, and dirt spills out of it when 
they drop it,330 the audience knows what to expect even before the 
pale hand breaks through the wood.331  Vampire!  And when that 
vampire later identifies himself as Dracula,332 just like Buffy, the 
audience begins to believe his claim when he turns into mist.333  The 
belief that the vampire might be Dracula is reinforced when he later 
turns into a bat.334 
The scene in the cemetery with Buffy and Dracula also makes the 
audience aware that Buffy is the woman who has attracted Dracula’s 
fancy; she is the one that he will seduce.  A few scenes make this 
apparent.  When Dracula first materializes in the cemetery, he 
admires Buffy from afar.335  He also tells Buffy that he came to 
Sunnydale solely to meet her.336  Additionally, when Willow and 
325. Id. at 36:07–36:10.
326. Id. at 36:14–36:15.
327. Id. at 36:16–36:20.
328. Id. at 38:00–38:05.
329. Id. at 11:31–11:37.
330. Id. at 7:24–7:55.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 8:38–8:44.
333. Id. at 7:24–7:55.
334. Id. at 11:31–11:37.
335. Id. at 7:24–7:55.
336. Id. at 9:45–10:36.
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Xander interrupt them, Dracula informs Buffy that he will see her 
later.337  Dracula seems not only interested in Buffy but captivated by 
her. 
The writer is also establishing Buffy’s character. When the 
audience first sees Buffy, she is lying restlessly in bed beside her 
boyfriend.338  She creeps quietly out of bed to go to on patrol in the 
cemetery, where she soon finds a vampire to fight and kill.339  Buffy’s 
fight with the vampire gives the audience the impression that this is 
not the first time she has engaged in such behavior.  As Buffy battles 
the vampire, she demonstrates that she is a skilled fighter.340  This fact 
is reinforced by her second fight with a vampire.341  These fights, 
coupled with her friends later referring to Buffy as “she who hangs 
out in headstones,”342 reinforce the idea that Buffy regularly hunts 
down vampires and slays them. 
When Dracula introduces himself to Buffy, another side of her 
personality is revealed—her independent, sarcastic streak.  Buffy 
does not just accept what some anonymous vampire tells her.  When 
he tells her he is Dracula, she doubts he is who he says he is.343  She 
challenges him with some snarky comments and tries to kill him like 
she would any other vampire.344  It is not until he transforms into mist 
and rematerializes behind her that Buffy begins to suspect that this 
could be Dracula.345  But he had to act like Dracula before she was 
willing to believe he might be Dracula. 
In the next few scenes, from when Dracula materializes into 
Buffy’s room to the point where he convinces her to taste his blood,346 
the writer is continuing to trigger the vampire myth and Dracula 
storyline.  The writer accomplishes this by showing Dracula enter 
Buffy’s bedroom as mist, put her under his thrall, and bite her.347  The 
Dracula storyline continues to be triggered when Buffy hides the bite 
mark with a scarf and later goes willingly to Dracula’s lair.348  
337. Id. at 11:31–11:37.
338. Id. at 00:26–1:20.
339. Id. at 4:24–4:26.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 10:37–10:47.
342. Id. at 8:53–9:22.
343. Id. at 20:31–22:23.
344. Id. at 20:31–22:23.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 30:06–30:07.
347. Id. at 20:31–22:23.
348. Id.
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Dracula’s seduction of Buffy, when he convinces her to taste his 
blood and to consider his offer of eternal life,349 also furthers the 
vampire myth and stock story. 
However, while the writer is continuing to trigger the vampire 
myth and Dracula storyline in these scenes, he is doing something else 
as well.  The writer is creating friction between the stock story and the 
parallel story that he is telling with Dracula and Buffy.  The new story 
fits well with the stock story; it is what the audience expects from a 
story that is based on the Dracula novel.  But there is a problem.  The 
way Buffy is acting is not consistent with who the audience knows her 
to be.  Buffy does not cooperate with vampires.  She does not just 
passively sit there and let them bite her!  She fights them.  She kills 
them. And she antagonizes them with snarky comments while she 
does it.  Buffy herself acknowledges the disparity between her usual 
behavior and her response to Dracula when she tells Dracula that 
sitting there and letting him bite her is not usually how she fights.350  
Even Buffy seems confused by her behavior. 
The writer makes the contradiction between Buffy’s character and 
her behavior even more apparent in the scene when Buffy and 
Dracula interact after she has gone willingly to his lair.  When Buffy 
whips out the stake,351 it appears that she has found herself.  It seems 
that she was not under Dracula’s thrall, that she went willingly to him 
only because she had a plan to kill him.  However, when Dracula 
orders her to put the stake down, and she obeys despite her own 
wishes,352 the audience feels discomfort again.  And this unease is only 
partially due to the situation in which Buffy now finds herself. 
Furthermore, when Dracula convinces Buffy to taste his blood, and 
she concedes,353 the audience feels extremely uneasy.  This isn’t Buffy; 
Buffy would never consider becoming a vampire. 
This audience response is precisely what the writer was going for. 
Despite knowing that the female always succumbs to Dracula’s 
seduction and that that very outcome is what the audience inherently 
expects from a Dracula story, that outcome does not seem natural 
here.  In fact, it seems weird because who Buffy is as a person.  She 
would resist more.  She would fight.  She would kill Dracula, or at 
least try to.  It is this contradiction, between the inherent outcome of 
349. Id. at 30:06–30:07.
350. Id. at 30:20–30:41.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 34:35–35:39.
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the stock story and how this story should end, that creates the 
audience’s discomfort.  They do not mesh. 
The final scenes, from Buffy tasting Dracula’s blood to her male 
friends entering the room,354 resolve not only the plotline but also the 
audience’s unease.  When Buffy tastes Dracula’s blood and the 
images of the first slayer and Buffy killing vampires flash through her 
mind,355 she remembers who she is.  She remembers that she is strong. 
She remembers that she is not a meek woman who sits passively by 
letting men control her fate.  She is the slayer.  Then she begins to act 
like herself.  When she knocks Dracula across the room and tells him 
that his blood is pretty gross,356 that is how the audience would expect 
Buffy to act.  When Buffy tells Dracula that the thrall has gone out of 
their relationship,357 the audience applauds the return of Buffy’s 
snarky side.  And when Buffy finally stakes Dracula,358 the audience is 
satisfied. 
The audience is satisfied because that is how this story would end. 
Buffy’s character demands this outcome.  It would not be believable 
for Buffy to succumb to Dracula’s seduction or for the men in her life 
to have to save her from Dracula.  Buffy is not saved by men; she 
saves them.  The friction that the audience felt between the Dracula 
framework and parallel story has disappeared.  It disappeared 
because Buffy finally behaved as the audience expected her to and 
the story ended in a way that seemed natural given her character. 
The writer has deviated from the embedded knowledge structure 
created by the Dracula storyline in a way that is not only plausible, 
but in a way that his resolution of the events seems like the only 
natural ending to the story.  The outcome associated with the Dracula 
plotline, where the female succumbs to Dracula and has to be rescued 
by her husband and an aged gentleman with knowledge of vampires, 
is made to seem strange in light of the fact that the female is Buffy 
Summers.  This new ending for the parallel story not only comports 
with who Buffy is, but it also remains consistent with the more 
general vampire myth. 
354. Id. at 38:00–38:05.
355. Id. at 35:00–35:55.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 36:07–36:10.
358. Id. at 38:00–38:05.
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2. Re-characterizing Battered Women as Individuals Involved in a Power
Struggle with Their Batterers Rather Than as Victims of “Learned
Helplessness” in Child Custody Cases
A small number of highly publicized cases where women have
asserted the battered woman syndrome as a defense when accused of 
killing their batterer have shaped and informed cultural images of 
battered women.359  These cultural images of battered women and the 
related assumptions about domestic violence have, in turn, affected 
the substantive law in ways that shape society’s perceptions of 
women.360  The “learned helplessness” phenomenon has been critical 
to the success of women asserting the battered woman defense.361  
Learned helplessness is a psychological state where an individual feels 
powerless to change her situation.362  This psychological state 
generally arises in response to persistent traumatic events, such as 
domestic violence.363  Individuals suffering from learned helplessness 
have learned to behave passively and submissively, even when 
presented with an opportunity to help herself.364 
While the concept of learned helplessness has been instrumental 
to the success of women asserting the battered woman defense, it has 
been harmful to society’s perception of battered women.365  Learned 
helplessness has contributed to a perception that battered women are 
“pathologically weak, that is, too helpless or dysfunctional to” take 
more rationale steps to save themselves.366  This image of battered 
women as pathologically weak and dysfunctional “has disserved 
battered women in other legal contexts, such as child custody.”367  The 
image of battered women as pathologically weak and dysfunctional 
reduces the psychological complexity of the battered woman.368  A 
359. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 
79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 988 (1991). 
360. Mahoney, supra note 359, at 2; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
361. Mahoney, supra note 359, at 2; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
362. See LENOREE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 47–48 (1979);
Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.63. 
363. WALKER, supra note 362, at 47–48; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.63.
364. WALKER, supra note 362, at 47–48; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.63.  It often
seems to those hearing the stories of battered women that they were not as helpless as 
they perceived themselves to be.  WALKER, supra note 362, at 47–48.  The battered 
woman’s behavior, however, was determined by her cognitive mindset, not from what she 
actually could or could not do.  Id. 
365. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
366. Id.; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 4.
367. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 4.
368. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.65; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 38.
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battered woman may be alternatively competent and forceful or 
passive and submissive depending on the coercion to which she is 
exposed.369  However, the concept of learned helplessness has molded 
society’s perception of the battered woman into one that denies the 
competent, forceful side of the battered woman.  If the battered 
woman is weak and passive in the context of domestic violence, she 
must be weak and passive in all aspects of her life. 
The image of battered women as pathologically weak and 
dysfunctional has also hindered the social response to domestic 
violence.370  It has hindered the social response to domestic violence 
because it “fuels a potent social tendency toward denial of battery in 
our society,”371 which causes some women to refrain from reporting 
domestic violence.372  As a result, society underestimates the 
prevalence of domestic violence and leads those members of society 
who are not in a battering relationship to perceive battered women 
“as substantially different from themselves.”373 
When representing a battered woman in a context other than a 
criminal trial for killing her batterer, a lawyer may struggle against 
society’s perception of battered women.  For instance, in a child 
custody case, the image of a battered woman as weak and passive 
may impact the custody decision.  This is because society will assume 
that if the battered woman suffers from learned helplessness, she 
must be weak and passive in all aspects of her life.  If the child is 
unruly or if someone has alleged that the woman’s partner is abusive 
of the child, then the common perception of battered women as weak 
will haunt the client.  Under circumstances where the child is unruly, 
a mother who is also a battered woman will be viewed as too passive 
and weak to take charge of the child and discipline him or her. 
Similarly, in a situation where there are allegations that her partner is 
abusing her child, the woman will again be seen as too weak to defend 
the child or as too helpless to take the child and leave her batterer. 
However, if the lawyer were to develop a more nuanced portrait 
of his or her client, the lawyer could create friction between 1) the 
way the legal audience would expect the client to act as a battered 
woman and the assumed outcome of the situation and 2) the 
character of the client.  In developing a more nuanced portrait of the 
369. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.65; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 30.
370. Mahoney, supra note 359, at 3; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
371. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.65.
372. Id.; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 3.
373. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.65; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 3, 5.
 2012] WHAT IF THE BIG BAD WOLF … WAS JUST MISUNDERSTOOD? 231 
client, a lawyer would characterize the client as generally strong and 
competent, rather than weak and submissive.  How would a lawyer do 
this given the social view of domestic violence?  First, a lawyer could 
depict “the battering relationship as a struggle for power and 
control,”374 with his client being one partner in such a relationship.375  
The lawyer could establish that, rather than being weak and 
submissive, his client (and implicitly those like her) was battered 
when she was exercising too much power and authority.376  Her 
partner had to put her in check, and he accomplished this by abusing 
her.  The lawyer could go on to support this characterization of the 
battered woman as strong by demonstrating that his client is 
competent and forceful in other areas of her life, such as at work or 
school or when parenting. 
By presenting the client as strong and capable and the battering 
relationship as a power struggle, the lawyer may create friction 
between how the legal audience inherently expects battered women 
to act and how it would expect this battered woman to act. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the legal audience would expect 
the lawyer’s generally strong and competent client to act would 
suggest an entirely different outcome than that indicated by the 
common view of battered women.  The audience would not predict 
that this woman would be an ineffective parent due to her 
helplessness and passivity.  On the contrary, it would predict that she 
would do all in her power to be an effective parent because she is 
strong and exercises her power when needed. 
V. Conclusion
In summary, because stock stories shape how a legal audience 
thinks about and evaluates a given situation, lawyers must be aware 
of the negative stock stories that may be triggered by the facts of their 
clients’ cases.  Lawyers must also be aware of the tools that are at 
their disposal when their clients do not fall comfortably within the 
confines of a stock story.  One tool that a lawyer can use to 
circumvent the negative effects of a stock story is accentuating either 
narrative coherence or correspondence.  By manipulating these 
threads of narrative rationality, a lawyer can tell very different stories.  
When emphasizing narrative coherence, a lawyer will narrowly focus 
on the facts leading to the trouble and on tying all the elements of the 
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story together so that it is plausible.  When stressing narrative 
coherence, on the other hand, a lawyer will map a cultural myth or 
stock story onto the client’s case in order to appeal to its persuasive 
power.  A lawyer can map a myth onto his client’s case by opening 
the lens to offer a broader view of the case that alludes to the myth. 
Another tool that a lawyer can use to circumvent the negative 
effects of a stock story or myth is creating a conflict between the 
client’s character and the inherent expectations regarding how the 
course of events should unfold and how the story should end.  By 
creating this friction, a lawyer can make a new conclusion seem more 
natural than that associated with the stock story or myth.  Thus, the 
lawyer uses the contradiction to appeal to the persuasive power of 
narrative fidelity.  These tools will allow a lawyer to avoid the 
negative effects of a stock story or myth. 
